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ABSTRACT:  
After the Cold War, a new constellation of actors entered transnational European assemblies. 
Their interpretation of European history, which was based on the equivalence of the two 
‘totalitarianisms’, Stalinism and Nazism, directly challenged the prevailing Western 
European narrative constructed on the uniqueness of the Holocaust as the epitome of evil. 
This article focuses on the mobilizations of these memory entrepreneurs in the European 
Parliament in order to take into account the issue of agency in European memory politics. 
Drawing on a social and political analysis centered on institutionally embedded actors, a 
process-tracing analysis investigates the adoption of the furthest-reaching official expression 
of a ‘totalitarian’ interpretation of Communism to date: the Resolution on European 
Conscience and Totalitarianism from April 2009. This case study shows that the issue was put 
on the parliamentary agenda by a small group of Central and Eastern European politicians 
who had managed to ‘learn the ropes’ of effective advocacy in the Assembly. An official 
vision of Communism then emerged through intense negotiations structured by interwoven 
ideological and national lines of division. However, this narrative largely remains of 
regional, rather than pan-European, relevance. In the competition for the definition of 
‘Europe’ and its values, the persistent diversity in the assessment of Communism gives 
evidence of the local rootedness of remembrance despite the pan-European ambitions of 
memory entrepreneurs. 
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Since the 1950s, the Council of Europe and the European Community/European Union 
have implemented a whole set of policies aimed at strengthening a hypothetical ‘European 
identity’ through the recollection of a common history and the promotion of shared values. 
The European political field is a complex configuration, composed of several interconnected 
but partially independent institutional arenas which produce a variety of public and official 
narratives about the past. The main institutional sources of these discourses are the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP), the 
EU Council and the European Commission. After the Cold War, a new constellation of actors 
has entered these arenas and upheld an interpretation of the history of Central and Eastern 
Europe based on the equivalence of the two ‘totalitarianisms’, Stalinism and Nazism. This 
vision challenged the core of the historical narrative that prevailed in Western European at the 
time: the uniqueness of the Holocaust as the epitome of evil (Mälksoo 2010; Pakier and Stråth 
2010).  
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This inflexion of the dominant institutional discourse is better understood when 
replaced in the longer evolutions of the narratives of ‘the common past of Europe’ produced 
by European institutions since their creation1 and in the academic and political debates on the 
‘singularity of the Holocaust’ versus the ‘totalitarian paradigm’2. Although its proponents 
present it as non-controversial, this reshaped official discourse on Communism is also the 
result of contentious negotiations within the European institutions, triggered by the 
mobilizations of a variety of political and social actors involved in a quest for ‘memory 
adjustment’ between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ member states of the enlarged EU. These 
memory entrepreneurs (Pollak 2000) are positioned at different levels of government and 
circulate from one to another, while belonging to various social sectors: politics, academia, 
victims’ associations and ‘National Memory Institutes’3. MEPs have been particularly 
influential in this collective endeavor to frame a new historical narrative and have used their 
symbolic resources (reputation, knowledge, competence, prestige…) in a twofold way. First, 
they have implemented a wide range of awareness-raising activities such as parliamentary 
exhibitions, screening of documentary films, hearings and conferences. Second, they have 
engaged in legislative work to produce Declarations and Resolutions in which the boundaries 
of a ‘legitimate’ Europe-wide discourse on Communism have been renegotiated. 
Consequently, the current dominant parliamentary discourse is tilted towards a ‘totalitarian’ 
and ‘crime-centered’ representation of this ideology and of the political regimes that availed 
themselves of it4. It stresses the ‘duty to remember’ and urges to ‘commemorate the victims’ 
in a way which bears a close resemblance to the Holocaust template5.   
Strikingly enough, these parliamentary memory entrepreneurs have been largely 
unexplored in the existing literature on the transnational politics of remembrance regarding 
Communism in Europe. Historical debates in the EP have been studied in order to compare it 
to PACE (Rostoks 2011), to analyze the case of the Holocaust (Waehrens 2011) or to 
investigate the institutional venues that are the most favorable to equating Communism and 
Stalinism (Littoz-Monnet 2013). While this literature often mentions the prominent role of 
post-communist politicians in constructing a post-Cold War discourse on Communism, its 
focus is usually restricted to the discourse itself. The actual mechanisms at play in this 
parliamentary work, which makes this Assembly a unique venue of transnational politics and 
policy-making, have so far been under-researched. The contention of this article is that it is 
necessary to meld discourse analysis with a sociological study of group mobilization, within 
                                                
1 See Calligaro in this special issue. 
2 There are two intellectual origins to the comparison of Communist and Nazi crimes: the discussion on 
totalitarianism and the controversy surrounding the interpretation of German history. The concept of 
totalitarianism, which implies that Nazism and Communism have more common points than differences, was 
widely used in the early phase of the Cold War to discredit the Soviet bloc. It has been increasingly criticized for 
its analytical shortcomings and political bias in Western Europe from the 1970s onwards, but taken up at the 
time as a symbolic weapon by the democratic oppositions in the Eastern bloc. The Historikerstreit which 
opposed liberal and conservative German historians about the integration of Nazism in German history in 1986-
1987 raised the issue of the uniqueness of the Holocaust versus the comparison with the crimes of Communism 
(Knowlton and Cates 1993). At the end of the 1990s, the Black Book of Communism again sparked hefty debates 
on totalitarianism and the assessment of Communism, both as an ideology and as the matrix of a distinct type of 
dictatorial regimes (Courtois et al. 1997; Rousso 1999). 
3 This generic term refers to the state-sponsored institutions established in Central and Eastern Europe to deal 
with the Communist past. Though their names and scopes of competence vary from country to country, they all 
conduct research and educational projects that contribute to building official narratives about Communism 
(Kopeček 2008). 
4 This coarse perspective on dictatorship stresses the role of terror in the inception and persistence of the 
Communist regimes, thereby disregarding the social and political mechanisms (ideological appeal after Fascism 
or Nazism, social mobility, compromises between States and societies, etc) that may explain their evolutions 
over time and their longevity (Rousso 1999). 
5 See Büttner and Leidinger in this special issue. 
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specific policy-making forums, in order to take fully into account the issue of agency in 
transnational ‘mnemopolitics’6. Drawing on a social and political analysis of the EP focused 
on institutionally embedded actors, it theorizes agency as ‘the ability to recognize and pursue 
individual interests, which varies according to the quality and types of resources held by 
social agents, pre-existing dispositions more or less adjusted to dominant norms in a context 
of interaction and finally the changes in the configurations and structures of power relations 
which create opportunities for a strategic reinterpretation of norms’ (Rowell and Mangenot 
2010, 3). This actor-centered political sociology of European integration centers the scope of 
enquiry on the reconstruction of institutional and social spaces of action characterized by 
asymmetric power relations, thereby proposing new avenues to understand the differential 
capabilities to pursue strategic aims which transform existing collective norms.     
In order to connect the parliamentary discourse on Communism to the institutional 
context of its elaboration, this article concentrates on the adoption of the furthest-reaching 
official expression of a ‘totalitarian’ interpretation of Communism to date: the ’Resolution on 
European Conscience and Totalitarianism’ adopted by the EP on 2 April 2009 (hereinafter: 
‘the Resolution’). A process-tracing analysis confirmed by elite interviews7 looks first at the 
specific resources and legitimacy of strategic actors who successfully put this issue on the 
parliamentary agenda. It then turns to the institutional and argumentative strategies used by 
these actors to try to impose this cognitive frame, before assessing the outputs of their 
activities in terms of narrativization of Communism in the EU.    
 
 
1.Agenda-setting in the EP 
Since the end of the Cold War, European organizations have become venues where 
domestic conflicts over the past can be continued or amplified. The salience of the topic of 
‘Communist crimes’ has gradually increased in transnational institutions after 2004, which 
paved the way for the uploading of some remembrance claims from domestic to European 
venues. 
 
The national dynamics of attempts to condemn Communism need to be recalled to 
draw a full picture of the national/transnational nexus that underpins the European politics of 
remembrance. In the early 1990s, the assessment of the Socialist period has been constructed 
as one of the cleavages which structured the nascent democratic political fields in the former 
Eastern bloc. From the mid-1990s onwards, numerous anti-Communist circles have criticized 
the ‘incomplete’ character of the regime change which had, in their view, allowed former 
Communist leaders to maintain comfortable positions in society and to evade justice (Mark 
2010). To a certain extent, the mounting pressures to manage the Communist past can also be 
interpreted as a reaction to the ‘mnemonic accession criterion’ imposed by the EU on its 
future member states. Giving greater visibility to the commemoration of the Holocaust and 
conducting a critical evaluation of collaboration with German SS and security police on the 
extermination of the Jewish population became one of the conditions which had to be met in 
order to join these organizations. In this context, anti-Communist activists set out to fight 
against the ‘double standards’ in the political, moral and legal judgment of Nazism and 
Stalinism. Although the legacies of Communism had been debated at PACE as early as 1992 
                                                
6 See the introduction to this special issue. 
7 Besides the final resolution the source material includes the motions for a resolution tabled by the political 
groups; the joint motions for a resolution that the groups agreed on; potential oral and written amendments; 
debates; explanations of votes; and votes. About 30 semi-structured interviews were also conducted with the 
relevant MEPs, their assistants and Parliament staff.  
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(PACE 1992; PACE 1996), the enlargement of the EU to ten post-communist countries in 
2004-2007 created new institutional venues to tear these claims out of their national 
frameworks. These memory entrepreneurs asked the EU to recognize more explicitly the 
sufferings endured by the ‘other Europe’ under Nazi occupation and Communism. In the 
literature, these demands have been analyzed as ‘claims for recognition’ (Closa Montero 
2011) or attempts to set a ‘Gulag memory’ against a ‘Shoah memory’ (Droit 2007). Despite 
the indisputable ‘politics of recognition’ involved in these demands, these interpretations may 
suggest a binary opposition between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ interpretations of the past, which 
would downplay the ideological dimension of the conflicting assessments of the former 
Communist regimes. Throughout the continent, European-level legitimization of the 
totalitarian interpretation of the communist past would indeed provide the Conservatives with 
a permanent symbolic advantage over the Left.  
 
It is against this background that a gradual, albeit contentious, change in the official 
remembrance of Communism occurred across transnational political venues during the 6th 
term of the EP (2004-2009). The numerous commemorations held during this period provided 
these entrepreneurs with a favorable political context8. However, the four milestones leading 
to the discussions on the Resolution illustrate the contentious logics of this agenda-setting.  
First, the conservative European People’s Party (EPP) adopted a Declaration in February 2004 
which called for the EU to ‘adopt an official declaration for the international condemnation of 
totalitarian Communism’ and invited ‘the designation of a “Day of Victims” of the totalitarian 
Communist regimes’ (EPP 2004). Because it proceeded from the right part of the political 
spectrum only, this Declaration had no direct official follow-up at the EU level.  
Next, the EP adopted a Resolution on ‘The Sixtieth Anniversary of the end of the Second 
World War on 8 May 1945’. Although its focus was pan-European, it pointed out that ‘for 
some nations the end of World War II meant renewed tyranny inflicted by the Stalinist Soviet 
Union’ (EP 2005). The issue of the comparison between Nazism and Stalinism was thus 
initially raised as part of a broader reflection on the Second World War and European 
integration. The debates on this text sparked controversy over the appropriate way to describe 
the fate of Eastern Europe after 1945 and the splits within the main parliamentary groups 
along national lines clearly showed the lack of common understanding of the war and of the 
Cold War in the Assembly (Neumayer, 2014).  
Third, in January 2006 PACE adopted a Resolution on the ‘International condemnation of the 
crimes committed by the Communist totalitarian regimes’ (PACE 2006). However, this 
symbolically powerful document had no practical implications because it did not get the two 
third majority of votes that is required to proceed to the Committee of ministers9.  
Finally, the EU Council reached an agreement in April 2007 regarding the Framework 
Decision on combating ‘particularly serious forms of racism and xenophobia by means of 
criminal law’, which allows member states to criminalize the public condoning, denial and 
gross trivialization of crimes ‘directed against a group of persons defined by reference to race, 
color, religion, descent, or national or ethnic origins’. Lithuanian representatives, backed up 
by their Polish and Latvian counterparts, failed to convince the Council to enlarge this list of 
criteria to ‘social status’ or ‘political convictions’ in order to penalize the denial of 
                                                
8 The anniversaries of the end of the Second World War, the Budapest Uprising, the Prague Spring, the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact and the fall of the Berlin Wall provided enabling conditions for the EU to reflect on the recent 
past. It did so by constructing a teleological narrative which presents European integration as the final outcome 
of all the struggles against tyranny during the XXth century. 
9 The adoption of this Resolution cannot be analyzed in this article due to space limitation, but the official 
documents adopted by PACE and the EP in 2006 and 2009 were interwoven and mutually supporting. 
5 
 
‘Communist crimes’10. As a compromise, the Council asked the European Commission to 
organize a public hearing on ‘crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed by totalitarian regimes’ (EU Council 2007). The Slovenian EU presidency 
organized this hearing in the EP on 8 April 2008. A small group of post-communist 
Conservative MEPs used this new opportunity structure to advance their claims during the 
Czech EU Presidency of January-June 2009, which coincided with the 20th anniversary of the 
demise of Central and Eastern European Communist regimes.  
 
These debates gave the ‘newcomers’ in the European Parliament the opportunity to 
build their parliamentary profile on historical issues. Yet, the EP is a specific institutional 
space defined by precise ‘rules of the game’ which structure power relations. Its members 
need to get a ‘practical understanding’ of those rules and the related institutional knowledge 
and know-how to accumulate ‘European credit’ and further their interests11. In addition, the 
EU constitutes a ‘multileveled and polycentric political field’ with a dual - national and 
supranational - power base, where actors typically try to transfer political resources from the 
national to the European level and back, to maximize their power. The relative strength of 
strategic actors in the debate on Communism therefore depended on both their institutional 
status and their social characteristics (Kauppi 2005, Georgakakis 2012).  
The initiation of the Resolution resulted from the joint efforts of two types of memory 
entrepreneurs. The first group was composed of former dissidents who had occupied 
important national political positions before becoming MEPs. They used a position of moral 
authority and symbolic resources derived from their own life stories to raise awareness about 
the ‘Communist crimes’ in the Assembly. The four figures of the opposition to the 
Communist regimes who were particularly active in this field were Sandra Kalniete, from 
Latvia; Vytautas Landsbergis, from Lithuania; Tune Kelam, from Estonia; and László Tőkés, 
from Romania. Their direct experience of state repression had produced convergent 
‘totalitarian’ representations of the Communist past12. Their previous political positions as 
heads of state (Landsbergis), diplomats (Kalniete) or long-time members of PACE (Kelam 
and Landsbergis) had also provided them with efficient resources in the EP: political 
negotiation skills at the national and international level; personal connections allowing for the 
activation of parliamentary, diplomatic and administrative networks. In addition, their 
                                                
10 EU Treaties explicitly mention ‘racism and xenophobia’ as violations of the principles on which the EU is 
based, which provides a legal basis for European action. In criminal law, EU actions are however limited to 
‘serious trans-border crime’ and to crimes that have already been recognized by international law. The scope of 
the Framework Decision is therefore restricted to ‘crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court [and in ...] Article 6 of the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945’. In 
addition, it states that ‘since the Member States’ cultural and legal traditions are, to some extent, different, 
particularly in this field, full harmonization of criminal laws is currently not possible’ (European Council, 2007). 
Unanimous vote would be required at the EU Council to enlarge the list of crimes which can be tackled at the 
EU level. The lack of political will of some member states, the principle of subsidiarity and the possible tension 
between fighting radicalism and respecting free speech are the major obstacles to such an extension of EU 
action.     
11 Knowledge of abstract parliamentary procedures should be distinguished from know-how, defined as an ability 
to develop specific skills: establishing contacts with representatives of different countries, spotting key players 
and identifying political allies, and conceiving ‘admissible arguments’ framed in a ‘general Europe perspective’ 
as opposed to ‘national’ or ‘ideological’ positions (Beauvallet and Michon 2010, 2012). See (Hix and Lord 
1997) and (Costa 2000) for additional analysis of the parliamentary work at the EP and the specific skills it 
involves. See also (Hurka and Kaeding 2012) on the relative marginalization of the EP’s new members during 
the 6th legislature.  
12 See for example the memoirs of two of these MEPs (Kalniete 2004; Landsbergis 2009). See also (Mark 2010) 
on the well-known controversy between Sandra Kalniete and the Vice-President of the Central Council of Jews 
in Germany at the Leipzig Book Fair in 2004. 
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parliamentary specialization as ’defenders of human rights’13 was instrumental in framing 
their cause as a universal human rights issue. These biographical characteristics were further 
strengthened by important institutional positions, such as vice-Presidency of the EP (Tőkés) 
or membership in the EPP Bureau (Landsbergis). 
 
Historical figures of the opposition to Communism 
 
*Sandra Kalniete (LV): born in relegation in Siberia in 1952, art historian. One of the leaders of the 
Latvian popular front (1989-1991), diplomat (ambassador to the UNESCO, ambassador to France, 
Foreign Affairs minister 2002-2004). Member of the Convention for the Future of Europe, European 
commissioner (2004), MEP (2009-).  
 
*Vytautas Landsbergis (LT): born in 1932, musicologist. President of the Council of the Sajudis 
movement (1988-91), President of Lithuania (1990-1992), member of PACE (1993-96, 2000-02), 
MEP (2004-2014).  
 
* László Tőkés (RO): born in 1952, bishop. Leader of the 1989 demonstrations in Timisoara. MEP 
(2007-), vice-president of the EP (June 2010- January 2012). 
 
*Tunne Kelam (EE): born in 1936, archivist and historian. One of the leaders of the independence 
movements in Estonia, member of the Estonian Committee (1990-1992) and of the Estonian 
Parliament (1992-2004). Member of PACE (1992-2000), MEP (2004-). 
 
The second type of memory entrepreneurs presented different properties: they were a 
bit younger, lacked the symbolic authority obtained in dissident activities but were closely 
linked to the EPP leadership and to national governments. Alongside Tunne Kelam, two of 
these MEPs initiated the parliamentary process leading to the adoption of the Resolution. The 
first one was József Szájer, from Hungary, who had been one of the founding members of the 
FIDESz right-wing party and served as vice-president of the EPP Group. The second one, 
Jana Hybášková, had close ties to the political and administrative leadership of the Czech EU 
Presidency. She acted as the channel through which a group of Czech social and political 
actors sought to give a European dimension to a controversial narrative of Communism 
centered on its ‘criminal nature’. 
The ‘Young Turks’ of anti-Communism 
*Jana Hybašková (CZ): born in 1956, PhD in philosophy in 1989, diplomatic career, MEP (2004-09). 
Member (2004-08) and President (2008-10) of the Democratic European Party. EU Ambassador to 
Irak (2011-).  
*József Szájer (HU): born in 1961, lawyer, one of the founding members of FIDESZ. EU-related 
career before 2004: President of the European Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament, 
Observer at the EP, member of the Convention for the Future of Europe. MEP (2004-) and vice-
president of the EPP Group. 
 
                                                
13 This specialization derives from their parliamentary activity: membership in commissions, drafting of reports, 
questions, declarations and motions for resolution. 
7 
 
A classic mechanism of uploading, that is a transfer of claims to the European level, 
then occurred through the so-called ‘Prague Process’14. After a protracted political and 
academic struggle, an Institute of National Memory called ‘Institute for the Study of 
Totalitarian Regimes’ (ISTR) had been created in 2007 in the Czech Republic. In order to 
establish its legitimacy in a very polarized national context, this Institute organized a 
conference on ‘European Conscience and Communism’ in Prague in June 2008, with the help 
of Hybášková and the support of the Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Vondra15. The 
‘Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Totalitarianism’ adopted during this 
conference was later signed by prominent former dissidents such as Václav Havel, Joachim 
Gauck and Vytautas Landsbergis, alongside 50 MEPs, members of PACE, human rights 
activists, historians and staff of several Institutes of National Memory.  
This Declaration demanded that the moral, political and legal treatment of Communism be 
placed on a par with that of Nazism. Although its first point stated that ‘both the Nazi and the 
Communist totalitarian regimes [should] each be judged by their own terrible merits’, the rest 
of the text only emphasized the ‘substantial similarities’ between these regimes because of 
their constant use of terror. It underlined, for example, that ‘exterminating and deporting 
whole nations and groups of population’ were indivisible parts of the ideologies they availed 
themselves with. Though it did not refer to the concept of genocide, the Declaration called for 
a qualification of ‘the many crimes committed in the name of Communism’ as ‘crimes against 
humanity’ and for the ‘introduction of legislation that would enable courts of law to judge and 
sentence perpetrators of Communist crimes and to compensate victims of Communism’. On a 
symbolic level, the parallel with Nazism justified establishing ‘23 August, the day of signing 
of the […] Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as a day of remembrance of the victims of both Nazi 
and Communist totalitarian regimes, in the same way Europe remembers the victims of the 
Holocaust on 27 January’. Finally, the Declaration suggested the creation of an ‘Institute of 
European Memory and Conscience which would be both […] a European research institute 
for totalitarianism studies [and] a pan-European museum/memorial of victims of all 
totalitarian regimes’ (Prague Declaration 2008). 
A first alignment of interest of actors situated in different political and administrative fields 
occurred in the EP on 18 March 2009, when the Czech presidency organized a hearing on 
‘European Conscience and the Crimes of Totalitarian Communism: Twenty Years After’ with 
the help of the Slovak Commissioner for Culture Jan Figeľ and of some signatories of the 
Prague Declaration (Kelam, Kalniete, Tőkés, Landsbergis and Szájer). On 2 April 2009, a 
direct outcome of the ‘Prague process’ was the adoption a parliamentary Resolution which 
took over most of the Prague Declaration.  
 
 
2.Institutional and argumentative strategies 
The adoption of the Resolution illustrates a successful socialization of newcomers, 
who managed to assimilate the parliamentary rules of interaction – and especially a capacity 
                                                
14 Literature on ‘uploading’ has demonstrated that even ‘soft’ EU policy instruments such as an EP Resolution 
can constitute important symbolic and strategic gains for domestic actors and provide sufficient motivation for 
seeking to involve the European level. Batory has shown, in a case study on the Hungarian media law 
controversy, that ‘uploading issues to the EP arenas is likely to be rewarding for national political actors who are 
in a weak position in their member state, have an image and values compatible with involving EU institutions in 
a given conflict, and resources that enable them to form a winning coalition at the European level in a debate 
they would stand to lose at home’ (Batory 2014: 234). 
15 Former dissident, close to Václav Havel, who led the Czech EU Presidency in 2009. 
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to overcome national and ideological divisions and to reach a political compromise between 
the two largest political groups in the EP, the EPP and the PES (Party of European Socialists).  
 
They afore-mentioned EPP memory entrepreneurs had to adjust their strategies to a 
changing configuration of actors involved in the debate on totalitarianism.  
In the run up to the parliamentary hearing of April 2008 the second largest group in the EP, 
the PES, had created a ‘Working Group on History’ in order to ‘invite the EU to act against 
any attempt to rewrite history’ (PES 2009a). This Working Group, headed by the Dutch MEP 
Jan Marinus Wiersma, included 3 ‘newcomers’ with very different life trajectories, who had 
actively opposed the Communist regime (József Pinior, from Poland), served this regime 
(Justas Paleckis, from Lithuania) or left the country (Libor Rouček, from the Czech 
Republic). Prominent MEPs from older member states also belonged to this Group: the PES 
German president (Martin Schulz) and one of its vice-presidents (the Austrian Hannes 
Swoboda), alongside Miguel Angel Martinez Martinez, a Spanish former exile under Franco. 
In order to avoid the public disagreements which had occurred in 2005, this rather 
heterogeneous group defined the PES official line during the negotiations on the Resolution in 
March-April 2009. 
 
PES ‘Working Group on History’ 
*Józef Pinior (PL): born in 1955, Solidarność leader, political scientist. MEP (2004-2009). 
*Libor Rouček (CZ): born in 1954, left the country in 1978. Political scientist. EU-related career 
before 2004 (Vice-Chair of the Committee for European Integration, Czech Parliament; head of the 
ČSSD observers’ delegation to the EP). MEP (2004-2014). At the EP: head of the ČSSD delegation 
(2004-2009); First Vice-Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee (2006-2009). Vice-President, PES 
Group (2009-2012). 
* Justas Paleckis (LT): born in 1942. Journalistic, diplomatic and administrative career before 1990. 
Vice-Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Lithuanian Parliament (1990-1992). Foreign policy 
advisor to the Lithuanian President (1993-1996). Ambassador of Lithuania to the UK (1996-2001). 
Deputy Foreign Minister of Lithuania (2002-2004). MEP (2004-2014). 
*Jan-Marinus Wiersma (NL): born in 1951. Studied History. Political advisor at the Foreign Policy 
Parliamentary Group of the Dutch Labour Party in the National Parliament (1978-1987). International 
Secretary and 2nd vice-president of the Dutch Labour Party (1987-1999). Vice-President, PES Group 
(1999-2004). MEP (1994-2009). 
 
*Hannes Swoboda (AT): born in 1946. Studied Law and Economics. Career in the SPÖ. MEP (1996-
). Vice-Chairman, PES Group (1997-2012). Chairman, PES Group (2012-2014). 
*Martin Schulz (DE): born in 1955. Bookseller and publisher. Career in the SPD. MEP (1994-): PES 
Group Coordinator, Subcommittee on Human Rights (1994-1996); PES Group Coordinator, 
Committee on Civil Liberties and Home Affairs (1996-2000); chair, PES group (2000-2012); 
President of the EP (2012-).  
*Helmut Kuhne (DE): born on in 1949. Sociologist. MEP (1994-2009). 
 
*Miguel Angel Martinez Martinez (ES): born in 1940. Opposition student leader under Franco, then 
in exile in France. Vice-President (1983-1992) and President (1992-1996) of PACE. MEP (1999-
2014). Member of the Board of Trustees of the House of European History (2011-…). 
 
This parliamentary debate emerged forcefully because the anti-Communist 
mobilizations cut across existing lines of division within the Assembly, along national 
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(‘newcomers’ versus ‘older’ member states) as well as ideological lines (right-wing versus 
left-wing political groups). The Conservatives, backed by the Liberals and the Greens, 
opposed the Socialists while the far-left refused to join the debates. But a closer look at the 
records of parliamentary debates gives evidence of splits within political groups. Though the 
left-wing groups were particularly prone to internal tensions regarding the nature of 
Communism and the relevance of the concept of ‘totalitarianism’, the various conservative 
sensibilities also held slightly different views on how to manage the legacies of the 
Communist regimes. Likewise, national cleavages should not be interpreted as a binary 
East/West division: some national delegations showed very specific voting patterns linked to 
distinct historical sensibilities16. In addition, some Euroskeptic MEPs objected to the 
Resolution because of its praise of European integration, and not because they disagreed with 
its interpretation of Communism (EP 2009b). The discussions on the content and wording of 
the Resolution17 defined the boundaries of a new, post-Cold War, legitimate discourse on the 
Communist past in the EP.  
 
Two issues proved the most controversial during the parliamentary debate organized 
on March 25th, 2009. The first one dealt with the potential existence of a single legitimate 
regime of remembrance in Europe: should the EP, or the EU as a whole, promote one vision 
or multiple perspectives on historical events? Can a Europe-wide memory of victimhood be 
established?  
One side of the argument held that it was necessary to process the past thoroughly in 
order to draw lessons from it. This is how Alexander Vondra explained the support of the 
Czech EU Presidency to the EU debate on ‘Communist totalitarianism’:  
Only by reconciling ourselves to history can we truly break away from the bonds imposed by 
the regimes of the past. Secondly, it is only by appreciating fully the suffering brought about 
by such regimes that we can fully understand the present. The European Union stands for 
everything that is the opposite of totalitarianism. For those of us who emerged from the grip 
of Communism, membership of the European Union is one of the main guarantees that we 
will never again revert to totalitarianism. This is a guarantee which we all share. It is 
something to be valued and never taken lightly. […] Thirdly, we owe it for the sake of our 
children. There are lessons to be learnt from our totalitarian past. Perhaps most important of 
these is the need for respect for human rights and fundamental values. 
In addition, some MEPs highlighted that there can be no true integration of Europe without, in 
Tunne Kelam’s words, the ‘integration of European historic perception’: 
I think that today what we need is not only the economic and political enlargement of Europe 
but the enlargement of European awareness of the massive crimes against humanity which 
occurred everywhere in Europe in the 20th century. We need the integration of European 
historic perception – the integration of prejudices and different views of history – as only in 
this way can we proceed to the better Europe of the future. 
 
This was supported by Hybášková’s statement for the EPP, which called for common 
action between ‘East and West’ on their ‘shared history’: 
                                                
16 Due to the role of the Communists during the civil war and the fight against the military regime in the 1960s-
70s, there are strong resistances to equalizing Nazism and Communism in Greece for example. Ten out of the 11 
Greek MEPs from the EPP abstained from voting on the Resolution. No other EPP member abstained.  
17 Parliamentary Resolutions are adopted on the initiative of one or more individual members. Initially the 
political groups table a motion for a resolution. Then they usually agree on a joint motion for a resolution which 
is debated in the plenary assembly. Finally the resolution is put to the vote and adopted by way of simple 
majority. 
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In 2005 we adopted a resolution on the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. 
We discovered that the European Parliament and the EU lacked the political will to pursue a 
common understanding and evaluation of European history. While the victims of Fascism and 
Nazism have received decent compensation, millions of victims of Communism have been 
forgotten. I am therefore delighted to announce that the resolution on the European 
Conscience and Totalitarianism, on which most political families in this house have been 
working this afternoon, is almost ready. Europe will not be united as long as West and East 
do not agree to joint studies, recognition, dialogue and understanding of the shared history of 
Fascism, Communism and Nazism. 
 
 
The counter-argument stressed that this debate may lead to the instrumentalization of 
history, as stated by Jan Marinus Wiersma, speaking for the PES:  
My group is not against the debate that is being held today per se, but we do have a great 
deal of difficulty with summarizing the result of this debate in a resolution. It gives the 
impression that we can lay down in a resolution how we should deal with Europe’s history, 
and specifically with the totalitarian past. […] As politicians, we have a responsibility when it 
comes to organizing what it is that we want to commemorate specially, but let us do that in 
collaboration with historians. 
The rejection of a ‘politically biased’ discussion was expressed in a more radical way by the 
Greek member Athanasios Pafilis, from the far left GUE (European United Left) group: 
The escalation in the European Union’s wretched anti-Communist strategy is a brazen insult 
to the people: with the counterfeiting of history, slander and lies, Fascism is being equated 
with Communism. The most reactionary and barbaric regime to which capitalism gave birth, 
namely Fascism, is being equated with the most progressive idea conceived by man, namely 
Communism and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man. It is an insult to the memory 
of twenty million Soviets who sacrificed their lives to conquer Fascism. This vulgar anti-
Communism is targeted not so much at the past; it is targeted mainly at the present and at the 
future.  
The second widely debated topic was related to the comparison of Communism and 
Nazism: are Nazism and Communism ‘equally criminal’ both as ideologies and as historically 
existing regimes? Should Communism, as an ideology, be distinguished from Stalinism, as a 
political regime?18  
József Szájer expressed the position of one group of MEPs who stressed the structural 
similarities between Nazism and Communism, in spite of their ideological differences: 
A democrat, a European cannot accept the fact that even today, even in this Parliament, there 
are people for whom the crimes of the Communist dictatorship are excusable and forgivable. 
A double standard distinguishing between victim and victim, crime and crime, suffering and 
suffering, death and death, is unacceptable. Those who try to justify the crimes of Communist 
dictatorship argue that all those horrors were committed by those regimes in the name of 
noble ideals, in the name of equality and fraternity. Ladies and gentlemen, Madam President, 
this is an enormous lie, and all they have done is to be counted not in their favor but against 
them, for it was with the promise of noble aims that they deceived people. 
                                                
18 See (Leggewie 2008) and (Kattago 2009) for a scientific discussion of these complex issues. 
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Likewise, László Tőkés underlined the ‘double standards’ in the management of the 
Communist and the Nazi legacies: 
The European Community must abandon the double standard that is evident in the different 
ways in which Nazism and Communism have been judged. Both inhumane dictatorships 
deserve equal condemnation. I ask the European Parliament to stand in solidarity with the 
victims of Fascist Communism and to help defeat the enduring legacy of Communism in 
accordance with the aforementioned moral, historical and political exigencies. Only in this 
way can a divided Europe be truly unified.  
 
On the other hand, some MEPs like the GUE member Vladimir Remek interpreted the 
condemnation of Communist crimes as an attempt to disqualify the Communist ideology as a 
whole:  
I am not blind of course and under so-called Communism there was repression, 
injustice and coercion. Yes, it is necessary to investigate and justly condemn the crimes. Yet 
[…] if someone does not want to see the difference between Communism and Nazism, 
between Communists in the past and Communists in the present, who like myself represent 
significant numbers of Communist voters here in Parliament after democratic elections, then 
they are perhaps simply trying to lump me together with the Nazis. 
In order to break away from this comparison, the Polish PES member Józef Pinior suggested 
taking other dictatorships into account when discussing the common European past: 
The Europe of today should remember the victims of 20th-century totalitarian regimes 
worldwide. Those victims are today the foundation of our memory, the lasting spiritual basis 
of European democracy. At the same time we see the entire history of the 20th century. We 
remember the victims of authoritarian systems, the victims in European countries, in 
nationalistic and militaristic regimes, in Spain, in Portugal and in Greece. 
 
After this first debate, the negotiations of the Resolution involved four consecutive 
steps leading to a compromise between the two biggest parliamentary groups. Hybášková, 
Kelam and Szájer first tabled a motion for the EPP on 25 March 2009, which reiterated the 
claims of the Prague Declaration (EPP 2009).  
The same day, the PES Working Group on History tabled its own motion for a very different, 
and much shorter, Resolution. The Socialists expressed a strong disinclination for politicians 
to tackle history: they cautioned against ‘misinterpretations of history’, underlined that 
‘objective historical narratives do not exist’ and recalled that ‘the 20th century history of 
Europe [was] very complex and ambivalent, as [were] people’s memories of it’. Regarding 
Communism, substantial differences distinguished the PES proposal from the EPP one.  
The Socialist motion refrained from using the expression ‘totalitarian Communist regimes’ 
and mentioned instead ‘authoritarian and totalitarian regimes’ or ‘dictatorships’, thereby not 
singling out ‘Nazism and Communism’ as the last century’s ultimate evils. Second, the 
motion emphasized that the specific historical legacy of the new member states should be 
taken into account. It pictured Nazism as the primary memory in Europe, with Communism 
seen as an addition: ‘whereas the dominant historical experience of Western Europe was 
Nazism, whereas the countries of Central Europe had added the experience of Communism, 
and whereas understanding has to be promoted for these countries’ double legacy of 
dictatorship’.  
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The PES likewise upheld a nuanced view on the equivalence between Communism and 
Nazism, by comparing Nazism with Stalinism, and not with Communism as such: ‘most 
historians agree that Nazism and Stalinism were essentially different, despite certain 
similarities, although from the perspective of the victims it makes no difference which regime 
deprived them of their liberty or tortured or murdered them for whichever reason’. 
Disregarding legal arguments, the only concrete action called for by the PES was of a 
commemorative nature: ‘the proclamation of a European-wide Remembrance Day for the 
victims of all totalitarian regimes, especially Nazism and Stalinism, to be celebrated with 
dignity and impartiality’ (PES 2009b).  
The following day, three other political groups - the Conservative ‘Union for Europe of the 
Nations’ (UEN), the Liberal ALDE (Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe) and the 
Greens, reacted with their own motion for a resolution which was tabled in each case by 
mostly post-Communist MEPs. These motions asked for more or less radical measures to 
manage the legacies of the Communist regimes: support to historical research, creation of an 
international Court of law, proclamation of a day to commemorate the victims of totalitarian 
regimes, etc. By contrast, the GUE and the Euroskeptic ‘Independents/Democrats’ 
(IND/DEM) did not table their own motion and refused to participate in the discussions.  
 
The EPP, the UEN, the Liberals and the Greens finally tabled a joint motion for resolution on 
30 March 2009, which the PES refused to join although it had taken over most of its own 
document. This tactic put the Socialists in a better position to impose almost all their 
amendments during the plenary session of the EP on 2 April 2009: although a simple majority 
is technically sufficient to adopt a Resolution, it would have been politically impossible for 
the EP not to reach an overwhelming majority on such a symbolically loaded text.  
8 out of the eleven PES amendments were indeed adopted during the plenary session. As a 
result, the Resolution’s final version started with several recitals warning against ‘political 
instrumentalization of history’. Rather than focusing only on Nazism and Stalinism, it 
included the Southern European dictatorships from Spain, Greece and Portugal in the 
common European past. The text also distinguished Stalinism from Communism and replaced 
the wording ‘Communism, Nazism and Fascism’ with ‘Nazism, Stalinism and the Fascist and 
Communist regimes’ when describing the pan-European historical legacy. The Resolution 
played down the importance of Soviet Communism by mentioning the human rights 
violations committed by ‘all the totalitarian and authoritarian regimes’ instead of singling out 
‘totalitarian Communist regimes’. Finally, its recital G mentioned ‘the uniqueness of the 
Holocaust’, which had been included in the initial motions of the Liberals and the Greens 
only. Although the unprecedented character of the extermination of the Jewish people by the 
Nazis was duly noted, its importance was greatly reduced compared to the Resolution on the 
end of the Second World War adopted in 2005 (EP, 2005). 
However, three of the PES amendments were voted down or orally amended during the 
plenary session. The amendment which portrayed Communism as ‘an addition’ to Nazism 
was rephrased in the following way: ‘the Central European countries have experienced both 
Communism and Nazism’. In this version, Soviet Communism (as a whole) is implicitly 
placed on the same footing as Nazism. Second, the call to create a ‘professional academic 
network to enhance cooperation among national research institutes’ instead of the ‘Platform 
of European memory and Conscience’ already mentioned in the Prague Declaration, was 
dropped. Third, the EP rejected the suggestion that historians should be consulted when 
choosing a date to commemorate the victims of ‘all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes’, 
instead of having politicians decide on 23 August (EP 2009).  
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This EPP-PES compromise, which barely preserved the historical specificity of the 
Holocaust while insisting on the crimes of Communism, paved the way for the adoption of the 
Resolution with an overwhelming majority.  
Among the 632 MEPs who participated in the vote (80% of the total number of seats), 554 
voted in favor of the Resolution (87% of votes), 44 against (7% of votes) and 33 abstained 
(5% of votes). In terms of participation to the vote, the most active MEPs were from the 
Greens (88% of the group members), the UEN (86%), the Liberals (85%) and the EPP (85%). 
About three quarters of the PES members (77%) and half of the Independents-Democrats 
(50%) voted on the resolution. By way of contrast, only 29% of the GUE members and 6.9% 
of the Non-Affiliated voted on the text. 
As regards the proportion of positive votes, the groups which were the most favorable to the 
Resolution were the ALDE (85% of the group’s votes), the UEN (84%), the Greens (83%) 
and the EPP (81%). 63% of the PES members approved the Resolution, alongside 53% of the 
Non-Affiliated and only 18% of the Independents-Democrats. Again, the GUE was 
particularly critical of the Resolution, which was approved by one of its member only19. 
 
Political Group Seats 
Vote for 
(% of the 
group’s seats) 
Vote against 
(% of the 
group’s seats) 
Abstention 
(% of the 
group’s seats) 
Participation to 
the vote 
(% of the 
group’s seats) 
EPP 288 235 (81.59 %) 0  10 (3.47%) 85% 
PES 217  137 (63.13 %)  31 (9.01 %)   0  77.4% 
ALDE 100  85 (85 %)  0  0 85% 
UEN 44  37 (84.09 %) 0 1 (2.27 %) 86.3% 
Greens/European 
Free Alliance 43 
 36 (83.72 %) 1 (2.32 %)  1 (2.32 %) 88.3% 
GUE-NGL 41 1 (2.43 %)  7 (17.07 %)  4 (9.75 %) 29.2% 
IND/DEM 22  7 (18.18 %)  1(4.54 %)  3 (13.63 %) 50% 
Non-Affiliated 30  16 (53.33 %)  5 (16.66 %)  2 (6.66 %) 75.69% 
Total EP 785 554 (70.57%*) 45 (5.73 %*) 33 (4.20 %*) 80.5%*  
*% of total EP seats 
 
 
3.Ambiguous Outputs: Narrating Communism in the EU   
 
Memory entrepreneurs in the EP have created analytical categories (‘totalitarian 
crimes’, ‘Communist crimes’) and figures (‘victims of Communist crimes’, ‘heroes of the 
anti-totalitarian resistance’), which they strive to impose in all public discussions of the 
                                                
19 The Dutch MEP Erik Meijer. 
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Communist past of Central and Eastern Europe. These figures and categories justify their 
demands of proof (opening of the archives), recognition (symbolic declarations and 
commemorative actions) and retribution (trials of perpetrators) (Fassin and Rechtman 2007). 
Although it mentions the uniqueness of the Holocaust and warns against politicization of 
history, the Resolution illustrates an undisputable discursive shift towards an interpretation of 
Communism centered on its criminal nature and its structural proximity to Nazism. 
Ambiguity prevails however regarding the practical consequences of this symbolic 
association of dictatorships, both within and outside the EP.  
Inside the Parliament, the Resolution represents the main symbolic weapon of anti-
Communist MEPs. In 2010, some of them formed an informal grouping called 
‘Reconciliation of European histories’ (REH), which was primarily led until 2014 by 
Kalniete, Landsbergis, Kelam and Tőkés. Contrary to the ‘multi perspective history’ 
promoted by European institutions (Garcia 2009), REH defined its aim as the establishment of 
a single ‘historical truth’ at the EU level: ’true reunification of European history based on 
truth and remembrance. We have to continue work on converging the views of all Europe 
about the history of the 20th century. […] We aspire to develop a common approach 
regarding crimes of totalitarian regimes, inter alia totalitarian communist regime of the USSR, 
to ensure continuity of the process of evaluation of totalitarian crimes and equal treatment and 
non-discrimination of victims of all totalitarian regimes’20. Its main activities consisted in 
adopting common declarations and in organizing conferences to discuss ‘Communist crimes’ 
and their legacies. However, REH was not recognized as an official Intergroup in the EP and 
its reach was restricted to a narrow parliamentary segment: the post-Communist political 
right. Out of its 40 official members in 2010-14, 32 came from a ’new’ member state and 33 
belonged to the EPP. This signaled a failure to engage with MEPs who did not share both a 
direct experience of Communism and Conservative political orientations.  
 
A similar lack of conclusiveness characterizes the three direct outcomes of the 
Resolution outside the EP. Legal debates, the establishment of a Day of Remembrance and 
the creation of an international research center/memorial have fallen short of the memory’s 
entrepreneurs’ projects.  
No development occurred in the legal sphere, which was only mentioned in the 
Resolution by a vague commitment to ‘support strengthened international justice’. The 
symbolic equalization of Nazism and Communism failed to produce the effects called for in 
the Prague Declaration: the European Commission rejected the suggestions made in various 
institutional arenas to penalize Communist crimes and bring perpetrators to justice, and the 
EU Council went along with the Commission’s position. 
After the hefty debates on the penalization of the denial of ‘Communist crimes’ which took 
place in the EU Council in 2007, the Commission was invited to ‘examine and to report to the 
Council within two years after the entry into force of the Framework Decision, whether an 
additional instrument is needed, to cover publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivializing 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes directed against a group of 
persons defined by other criteria than race, color, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin 
such as social status or political convictions’ (European Council 2007b: 25). The Commission 
requested an expert study to be submitted in January 2010, which provided a comparative 
analysis on ‘how the memory of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe is dealt 
with in the Member States’ (Closa Montero, 2010). This comprehensive comparison was 
decided by the Commission in order to depoliticize the issue of Communist crimes by 
‘diluting’ it in a broader reflection on the management of non-democratic pasts throughout the 
                                                
20 http://eureconciliation.wordpress.com/about/ 
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continent21. In December 2010, a few days before the Commission’s report was due, six 
Foreign ministers from the former Eastern bloc22 wrote an official letter to the European 
justice commissioner, calling for communist crimes to be ‘treated according to the same 
standards’ as those of Nazi regimes, notably in those countries with Holocaust denial laws. 
The European Commission, however, relied on the expert study to confirm that the legal 
conditions for adopting an additional instrument at EU level were not met, because the denial 
of Communist crimes is absent in the national legislation of most EU member states23 
(European Commission 2010).  
Likewise, the calls for the creation of an International Court which would have its seat in the 
EU and try crimes against humanity have not led to any practical measures. Besides the lack 
of EU competences, there are additional legal obstacles to the creation of an International 
Court: it would be necessary to prove that there are obstacles at the national level to the 
proper trial of these crimes and that all other international legal venues, such as the European 
Court of Human Rights, have been used in vain24. 
Second, 23 August was indeed established as ‘day of Remembrance for the victims of 
all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes’ in the EU but failed to gain the same symbolic 
significance as 27 January, the day when Holocaust victims are officially mourned throughout 
the continent. Although the EU Justice Commissioner makes a speech on 23 August, official 
commemorations are organized on a large scale only in the Baltic states, which were directly 
affected by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In these countries, the memory of national suffering 
under Soviet and Nazi occupation tends to occlude the centrality of the Holocaust and the 
domestic mnemonic landscape is particularly polarized (Kattago, 2009). 
The third direct impact of the Resolution has been the creation of Platform for 
European Memory and Conscience. This network was set up to stabilize the links between the 
afore-mentioned four MEPS from the REH group (who belong to its Board of Trustees), 
Institutes of National Memory and like-minded sectors of academia who endow the 
‘totalitarian’ narrative with scholarly authority25. The Platform representatives systematically 
underline that it draws its legitimacy from the EP Resolution. It is however a markedly 
Central and Eastern European endeavor: its creation was strongly supported by the Czech 
authorities, the ISTR hosts its logistical center in Prague and its Representatives come from 
the former Eastern bloc only. Although the European Commission financially supported its 
two flagship projects in 2013 (a reader for high school students untitled Lest we forget: 
Memory of Totalitarianism in Europe and a travelling exhibition on ‘Totalitarianism in 
Europe’), the Platform never received operational support for its activities. To date, its 
lobbying activities aimed at increasing the share of financial support for projects related to 
Stalinism in the program ‘Europe for citizens’ and to take legal steps to prosecute the crimes 
against humanity perpetrated during the Communist period have been unsuccessful. 
Moreover, the Platform’s intention to create a European museum of totalitarianism in Brussels 
which would also serve as a memorial for the victims, has failed to materialize.  
 
The limited impact of the Resolution underlines the importance of the global context, 
but also of the constraints stemming from the institutional venues in which these 
remembrance claims are expressed.  
                                                
21 Interviews, European Commission, January 2014. 
22 From Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria. 
23 With the exception of Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. 
24 Interviews, European Commission, January 2014. 
25 The only historian who belongs to its Board of Trustees is Stéphane Courtois, editor of the Black Book of 
Communism. 
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Requests for a Europe-wide condemnation of ‘Communist crimes’ have been justified 
by moral and legal arguments linked to emerging global norms such as the universalization of 
the figure of the ‘victim’, the ‘globalization’ of the Holocaust and the tendency to handle 
painful pasts in courts of law. Attempts to align on the paradigmatic example of the Holocaust 
have nevertheless met with outrage from several left-wing movements and Jewish 
organizations. Some of them have interpreted these remembrance claims as thinly veiled 
attempts to ‘trivialize the Holocaust’ while mitigating East Europeans’ own complicity in the 
extermination of the Jewish population26. This confirms that the Holocaust does remain the 
‘negative founding myth for Europe’ after the end of the Cold War (Leggewie 2008: 219), 
whereas the ‘Velvet Revolutions’ of 1989 have failed to symbolize the beginning of a new era 
for the whole continent.  
According to Kattago, three factors account for the particular status of the Holocaust in 
transnational remembrance policy, the main ones being the assumption of the extermination 
of the Jews as an unprecedented, singular event, and the fact that their systematic killing 
occurred in both Eastern and Western parts of Europe. Moreover, Communism ended 
peacefully, without any official recognition of the crimes committed in the name of the Soviet 
Union, whereas the Nuremberg Trials established the important precedent of crimes against 
humanity and paved the way for the codification of human rights in international law. Third, 
anti-Communist memory entrepreneurs represent just one side of the debate between ‘a 
politics of memory emphasizing the specificity of culture in national narratives’ on the one 
hand, and on the other hand a perspective which claims that Communism must be assessed on 
the basis of universal norms and values, in order to solve ‘the tension between unique culture 
and shared humanity’ (Kattago 2009: 375).  
This structural tension between universal values and particular historical experiences 
is extremely strong in the EU as well, which provides memory entrepreneurs with specific 
constraints. To be considered as a legitimate player in the European game, MEPs need to 
‘denationalize’ their cause and underline the ‘European’ relevance of their claims. Yet many 
of the anti-Communist memory entrepreneurs rely primarily on a ‘biographical’ legitimacy 
linked to the figure of the ‘witness-victim’. This provides them with moral authority but 
makes it difficult to ’rise above national idiosyncracies’ and represent ‘the general European 
interest’. The legacy of the West European Left also partly accounts for their difficulty to 
reach out to older member states, as for many of its representatives Communism is both a 
viable ideology and a political party within European parliamentary democracy.      
Faced with these constraints, anti-Communist entrepreneurs have developed 
ambiguous repertoires in a search for a balance between ’humanitarian-oriented’ and 
‘conflict-oriented’ framing when assessing Communism. The former stresses ‘compassion for 
the victims of human rights violations’ while underlining their innocence and the injustice 
they suffered - which leads to a certain de-politicization of the cause. The latter, by contrast, 
relies on the terminology of ‘heroes’ and ‘martyrs’ and underlines the active fight of a given 
political camp against state terror. The reference to human rights and the category of victim, 
while giving the cause a broader significance, tends to erase this combative dimension. The 
combination of these repertoires underlines a central challenge faced by these memory 
                                                
26 The Prague Declaration and the 2009 EP Resolution prompted Shimon Samuels, the Simon Wiesenthal 
Centre's Chief Delegate and Director for International Relations, to send a statement to the OSCE in which he 
condemned ‘a Project to Delete the Holocaust from European History’: 
http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/s/content.asp?c=lsKWLbPJLnF&b=4442915&ct=7548759#.VHXAF
c90zIU (accessed December 1st 2014). The American-born scholar and activist Dovid Katz provides another 
example with his long-lasting campaign against what he calls ‘the obfuscation of the Holocaust’: 
http://defendinghistory.com/ (accessed December 1st 2014). 
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entrepreneurs in their struggle for a Europe-wide historical narrative: respecting the normative 
constraints imposed by global norms and European institutions, while achieving recognition 
of Central and Eastern European particular historical legacies. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
This article has argued that a process-tracing analysis centered on institutionally 
situated actors makes new inroads in the study of memory politics and policy-making in 
Europe. It provides an alternative to essentialist or normative conceptions of transnational 
mnemopolitics which tend to overlook the crucial issue of agency in the struggles over the 
understanding of the past. This case study of the discussion of ‘Communist crimes’ in the 
European Parliament has shown that the issue was put on the agenda by a small group of 
Central and Eastern European memory entrepreneurs who had managed to ‘learn the ropes’ of 
effective advocacy within the Assembly. An official vision of Communism then emerged 
through intense negotiations led by the two major political groups and structured by 
ideological and national lines of division. 
The adoption of the Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism provides 
three main insights into the functioning of the European Parliament. As regards uploading 
strategies, the negotiations over the wording of the document show that memory 
entrepreneurs need to adjust their rhetoric to the legitimate patterns of discourse of the chosen 
institution. This creates a tension between particularistic experiences and universal values, 
which is solved by referring to human rights and by embedding this narrative on Communism 
inside a laudatory account of European integration as the best way to overcome 
totalitarianism. Second, the successful adoption of the Resolution points to the benefits of 
uploading strategies during national controversies. The interpretation of the Communist past 
remains ideologically polarized throughout the former Eastern bloc, and the EP Resolution 
represents a symbolic advantage for Liberals and Conservatives on the Left in national 
political fields. Third, this official document signals that the marginalization of the 
‘newcomers’ in the Assembly has been partly overcome, since they have managed to alter the 
hegemonic Western narrative on the common past of Europe by including the specific history 
of post-Communist Europe.  
However, this ‘totalitarian’ conception of Communism remains to a certain extent of 
regional, rather than pan-European, relevance. Although the proclamation of 23 August as a 
day of ‘Remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes’ and the 
creation of the Platform for European Memory and Conscience illustrate the self-assertion of 
post-communist states in the EU, the lack of symbolic resonance of these endeavors in 
Western or Southern European societies points to a persistent mnemonic fragmentation in 
Europe. In the competition for the definition of ‘Europe’ and its values, the persistent 
diversity in the assessment of Communism ultimately testifies to the local rootedness of 
remembrance despite the pan-European ambitions of memory entrepreneurs.  
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